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Abstract: Philosophers have recently highlighted substantial affinities between causation and 
grounding, which has inclined some to import the conceptual and formal resources of  causal 
interventionism into the metaphysics of  grounding. The prospect of  grounding interventionism raises 
two important questions: exactly what are grounding interventions, and why should we think they 
enable knowledge of  grounding? This paper will approach these questions by examining how causal 
interventionists have addressed (or might address) analogous questions and then comparing the 
available options for grounding interventionism. I argue that grounding interventions must be 
understood in worldly terms, as adding something to or deleting something from the roster of  
entities, or making some fact obtain or fail to obtain. I consider three bases for counterfactual 
assessment: imagination, structural equation models, and background theory. I conclude that 
grounding interventionism requires firmer epistemological foundations, without which the 
interventionist's epistemology of  grounding is incomplete and ineffectually rationalist. 
Keywords: grounding interventionism, causal interventionism, epistemology of  metaphysics, 
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1. Introduction 
 Philosophers have recently drawn substantive connections between grounding and causation, 
by drawing attention to their shared formal, metaphysical, and epistemic features.  Grounding is 1
standardly taken to be an asymmetric metaphysical dependence relation that either is explanatory or 
backs explanation, wherein some derivative fact or entity obtains or exists in virtue of  some more 
fundamental fact or entity.  Grounds are also standardly (though not universally) taken to 2
metaphysically necessitate that which they ground.  Typical examples include: Socrates grounds 3
Singleton Socrates, the fact that P and the fact that Q together ground the fact that P∧Q, the fact 
that P grounds the fact that P∨Q, God’s love grounds the pious (or vice versa), natural features 
 See Schaffer (2016) and A. Wilson (2018a, 2018b, forthcoming). For critical responses, see Bernstein (2016) 1
and Koslicki (2016). See also Wang (2020) for discussion.
 For introductions to grounding, see Audi (2012), Fine (2012), Raven (2015), Rosen (2010),  Schaffer (2009). 2
On the connection between grounding and explanation, see Dasgupta (2017), Glazier (2020), Maurin (2015), 
and Thompson (2016).
 See deRosset (2010), Rosen (2010), and Trogdon (2013). For dissenting views, see Leuenberger (2014) and 3
Skiles (2015). 
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ground moral features, truthmakers ground truths, and fundamental physical facts ground biological 
facts.  
 Grounding is normally thought to differ from causation in some key respects. For instance, 
grounding can relate abstract relata, is synchronic, and relates more fundamental relata to less 
fundamental ones. By contrast, causation only relates concrete physical events, is diachronic, and 
typically relates equally fundamental relata (inter-level causation being an unusual and contested sort 
of  case). Nevertheless, philosophers have also emphasized a number of  features in common. 
Grounding and causation are both standardly thought to be irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive 
metaphysical dependence relations of  a productive nature, intimately bound up with explanation and 
aptly captured by counterfactual conditionals.  
 Those who emphasize the parallels between causation and grounding have attempted to 
extend the conceptual and formal resources of  interventionism to grounding. For instance, A. 
Wilson claims: 
The deep structural similarity between grounding and causation suggests that the asymmetry 
of  grounding is reflected in an asymmetry of  consequences of  interventions. If  we 
intervene to change the ground fact, the grounded fact changes. If  we intervene to change 
the grounded fact, the ground fact is unchanged. (A. Wilson forthcoming, 18) 
According to this line of  thought, interventionist conditionals capture important features of  
grounding. Similarly, Schaffer uses interventionist language to describe a test for grounding claims: 
“there is a straightforward and informative…working test of  token grounding to be had, in terms of  
counterfactual covariation: wiggle the ground, and the grounded wiggles” (Schaffer 2016, 74). So 
there is some initial inclination in the literature to enfold grounding under the interventionist rubric. 
Call the resulting view (to be precisified below) grounding interventionism.  
 Causal interventionists face foundational challenges to the articulation and defence of  their 
view, which have been well explored in metaphysics and philosophy of  science.  They include, most 4
prominently, the challenge of  cashing out the central notion of  an intervention in a way that is not 
viciously circular. Nevertheless, causal interventionism remains an attractive theoretical alternative in 
certain respects, partly due to the capacity of  counterfactual conditionals to capture and explain a 
heterogeneous array of  cases (Paul 2009), as well as the elegance and power of  the formal 
machinery that accompanies it (Pearl 2000). It is natural to hope that accounting for grounding in 
interventionist terms might prove similarly fruitful. 
 However, before getting too optimistic about the prospects for grounding interventionism, a 
number of  substantive questions must be addressed. First, what does it mean to ‘wiggle the ground’, 
as it were, and to see if  the grounded wiggles? That is, what are grounding interventions, and what 
do they involve? Second, what are the epistemic credentials of  grounding interventionism? That is, 
is ‘wiggling the ground’ and seeing what happens a good way to find out about grounding? Can 
would-be grounding interventionists offer a satisfactory epistemological story about how we can 
come to know or form justified beliefs about grounding? The aim of  this paper is to address both 
sorts of  question.  
 Hitchcock and Woodward (2003); Meek and Glymour (1994); Pearl (2000); Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 4
(2000); Woodward (1997, 2000, 2003); and Woodward and Hitchcock (2003).
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 We may begin to do so by looking to antecedent articulations and refinements of  the 
substance of  causal interventionism. In particular, to help clarify what it might mean to ‘wiggle the 
ground’, we may consider how causal interventionists have characterized ‘wigglings’. They standardly 
characterize the class of  causal interventions as not limited to actual manipulations or practically 
possible ones, since causation is often independent of  what we actually do and of  what is practically 
possible for us to do. For example, Woodward points out that past events and large-scale 
cosmological events are uncontroversially causal, notwithstanding the impossibility of  our 
manipulating them (2003, 10). So the relevant class of  interventions must include counterfactual 
interventions. Evaluating the relevant counterfactuals sometimes requires us to countenance far out 
(that is, modally remote) scenarios.  It will be instructive to attend to this feature of  causal 5
interventions, because — as we will see —- grounding interventionism likewise requires us to 
countenance far out counterfactual scenarios.  
 Since counterfactuals are so central to causal interventionism, the epistemology of  
counterfactuals is a natural place to begin considering how the causal interventionist’s 
epistemological story might go. All sorts of  philosophical and psychological work has been done on 
the epistemology of  counterfactuals.  I will consider three (mutually compatible) suggestions about 6
what enables and constrains counterfactual reasoning. First, I will consider Williamson’s (2007b) 
epistemology of  counterfactuals, which assigns a prominent role to the imagination. On that view, 
imagination is the key cognitive capacity that allows us to perform the needed counterfactual 
evaluations, and to wiggle a causal or grounding relatum is an imaginative act. Second, I will consider 
structural equation models, which formally represent causal and grounding dependencies and 
potentially illuminate relations among concepts and claims of  interest. Finally, I will consider the 
potential for background theory to constrain counterfactual evaluation. Evaluating the epistemic 
credentials of  grounding interventionism will then require determining whether the epistemic 
resources at issue — imagination, structural equation models, or theoretical constraints — can 
adequately constrain our assessments of  grounding counterfactuals.  
 I will argue that when imagination is taken to be the primary basis for evaluating 
interventionist counterfactuals, interventionist frameworks — whether causal or grounding — 
require us to stretch our imaginative resources beyond their adequacy conditions. In cases where 
experience doesn’t constrain imaginative simulations, imagination calls on antecedent intuitions that 
lack adequate epistemic footing. If  so, then causal interventionism and grounding interventionism 
alike invoke an epistemically deficient form of  modal rationalism. Moreover, I will argue that 
structural equation models can at best complement an independent epistemology of  interventionist 
counterfactuals, because they require prior knowledge of  the structural equations they encode. 
 For convenience, I will occasionally invoke the metaphor of  modal distance, but I don’t wish to hang much 5
on it, since it suggests a kind of  linear progression of  difference from actuality (merely logical possibilities 
always differing most from reality as compared to merely metaphysical possibilities, as compared to merely 
physical possibilities) that breaks down under scrutiny, with carefully chosen examples. I thank Anand Vaidya 
for drawing this to my attention.
 See, for instance, Byrne (2007), Hoerl et al. (2011), Ichikawa (2011), Kroedel (2012, 2017), Mandel et al. 6
(2005), Schulz (2017), and Williamson (2007a, 2007b).
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Lastly, I will argue that holding fixed certain background theories can constrain our evaluation of  
some interventionist counterfactuals, but that counternomics and countermetaphysicals again force 
us toward an unacceptably rationalist modal epistemology. 
 Let me be clear in advance about the strength of  my thesis. I will not argue that grounding 
interventionism renders knowledge of  grounding unachievable. I will argue, rather, that the 
epistemic credentials of  grounding interventionism are limited — cognizance of  which should 
temper erstwhile high hopes that the interventionist framework can imbue theories of  ground with 
increased objectivity, greater scientific respectability, or improved capacity for discovery. There are a 
spectrum of  cases running from straightforward and unproblematic cases to intractable ones. My 
central claim will be that none of  the candidate epistemological stories gets us very far past the easy 
end of  the spectrum. Moreover, since grounding theorists don’t typically confine themselves to the 
easy end, the available epistemological options don't go very far toward vindicating metaphysical 
practice.  
 Section 2 will describe Woodward’s causal interventionism and consider some possible 
formulations of  grounding analogs. Section 3 will detail the causal interventionist’s notion of  an 
intervention before using it to guide the articulation of  an analogous ground-theoretic notion. 
Section 4 will concern the epistemology of  interventionist counterfactuals. It will address three 
(potentially complementary) approaches to counterfactual evaluation, respectively involving 
imagination, structural equation models, and theoretical constraint. At the same time, it will evaluate 
the capacity of  each approach to generate knowledge or justified belief  with respect to causation 
and grounding. Section 5 will conclude.  
2. Interventionisms 
 Theories of  causation have many different aims — they can concern causation itself, causal 
patterns, causal explanation, causal discovery and prediction, causal concepts and language (or their 
use in certain contexts), causal learning and reasoning, effective strategies, and so forth. I will 
conceive of  causal interventionism as a primarily ontological project, i.e. as the project of  non-
reductively accounting for causation and identifying causal relationships. I will take Woodward’s 
(2003) account as an exemplar. On his account, relationships between variables are causal when 
(roughly) intervening on one results in a change to the other (2003, 45). Assuming from here on that 
X and Y are not identical: 
Causal interventionism:  X causes Y iff  there is a possible intervention on X that 
changes the value of  Y. 
Woodward qualifies the view in a number of  fine-grained ways, which I’ll omit in the interests of  
maintaining a simple and general sense of  the view. As I have already noted, since there are salient 
senses in which interventions need not be possible, the view is also amenable to counterfactual 
formulation: 
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Causal interventionism (counterfactual):  X causes Y iff  there is a possible intervention on X that, 
were it carried out, would change the value of  Y.  
A natural place to start when formulating grounding interventionism would be by constructing an 
exactly parallel view. Such a view would say, roughly, that two variables represent a grounding 
relation when intervening on one results in a change to the other. Formulated counterfactually, we 
get the following view. Assuming from here on that ⍺ and β are not identical: 
Grounding interventionism (counterfactual):  ⍺ grounds β iff  there is a possible intervention on ⍺ that, 
were it carried out, would change the value of  β. 
Note that I have changed the variables from the causal formulation to reflect potential differences in 
kind between causal relata and grounding relata. Without any explicit restriction to the ranges of  the 
variables, causal interventionism and grounding interventionism appear to make the precisely the 
same condition sufficient for causation and for grounding. In fact, they appear to collapse 
counterfactual dependence with causation and grounding, respectively, in a way that would be 
immediately implausible to anyone who thinks counterfactual dependence tracks multiple kinds of  
metaphysical dependence. At any rate, grounding and causation are standardly thought to have 
incompatible features. In particular, as I mentioned at the outset, grounding is normally thought to 
be synchronic and causation diachronic; but a relation cannot be both at once, since one relatum is 
either temporally co-present with another or not.  If  that’s right, then without further qualification, 7
causal interventionism and grounding interventionism are incompatible, because they entail that any 
case of  causation is a case of  grounding and vice versa. This presents a problem for anyone wishing 
to endorse a package deal of  both interventionisms. 
 However, the ranges of  the variables typically are restricted by the aptness conditions of  the 
relevant interventionist models. For instance, Schaffer specifies aptness conditions for causal models 
and for grounding models, according to which the variables range over events and entities, 
respectively (2016, 67 & 74). Would-be grounding interventionists who take the relata of  grounding 
relations to be facts would have to formulate that condition differently. If  causation and grounding 
are indeed mutually exclusive, their challenge would be to do so in a way that precludes a single 
dependency from fitting both the causal and the grounding models. This would presumably require 
holding fixed a philosophical background theory according to which facts and events are categorially 
distinct.  8
 I borrow this characterization of  the synchronic/diachronic distinction from J. Wilson (in progress), who 7
convincingly argues that the distinction is not between temporal instantaneity and extension but rather 
temporal co-presence and non-co-presence. It is also worth noting that A. Wilson argues that the apparent 
distinction between causation and grounding in terms of  their respective diachronicity and synchronicity 
“does not run deep” (2018b, 729).
 I thank an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to consider aptness conditions such as these more 8
explicitly. 
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 An alternative to relying on aptness conditions alone to adequately restrict the application of  
each interventionist view would be to weaken the views by removing their sufficiency conditions. In 
the case of  grounding interventionism, the resulting view would be as follows: 
Grounding interventionism (weak): ⍺ grounds β only if  there is a possible intervention on ⍺ 
that, were it carried out, would change the value of  β. 
Since we are not in the business of  providing a reductive account, this appears to be a reasonable 
amendment to the view. However, even this weakened formulation apparently admits of  
counterexample. For instance, suppose that P grounds P∨Q. It is possible to wiggle P without the 
truth of  the disjunction wiggling.  Where both P and Q are true, P and Q each fully grounds the 9
disjunction. This is a case of  grounding overdetermination (Koslicki 2015) that is analogous to cases of  
symmetric causal overdetermination, in which some effect has more than one operative and 
individually sufficient cause. As such, it is a case of  grounding that does not satisfy the necessary 
condition posited by grounding interventionism (weak).  10
 Suppose we stipulate that grounding interventions must wiggle all the putative grounds. That 
would mean we could not capture as much grounding structure as we would like, since we would not 
have the means to say that, in cases of  symmetric grounding overdetermination, each ground is 
individually sufficient for grounding. Another response would be to argue that cases of  symmetric 
grounding overdetermination can be bracketed, by suggesting that they are an artifact of  a sui generis 
kind of  logical grounding (Correia 2014), which requires an independent account. Yet symmetric 
grounding overdetermination may not be so easily bracketed. A. Wilson describes it as 
“commonplace” and gives an example that — to my mind — is not logical: the potion’s being 
poisonous is grounded in its containing 1 gram of  arsenic and also in its containing 1 gram of  
strychnine (A. Wilson 2018b, 743). A further response to grounding overdetermination would be to 
weaken grounding interventionism still further, so that it posits neither necessary nor sufficient 
conditions for grounding, but instead says that some counterfactual conditionals track some grounding 
relations. However, without general principles stating when and why the counterfactual analysis 
applies, such a view would not be particularly illuminating. 
 A more promising response might be to selectively negate the influence of  any 
symmetrically overdetermining relata. Woodward suggests that, in cases of  symmetric 
overdetermination, causal interventionists can get the right result for a particular cause X by, 
roughly, “freezing” the influence of  other direct causes and finding that an intervention on X will 
 Thanks to Claudio Calosi for raising this counterexample. 9
 If  the affinities between grounding and causation do indeed run deep, then it isn’t surprising that the cases 10
that make trouble for causal interventionism — including symmetric overdetermination and, as we will see 
below, preemption — make trouble for grounding interventionism, too. Grounding interventionists such as 
Schaffer and A. Willson acknowledge such problems and hold only that the interventionist framework works 
for a range of  suitably unproblematic cases. 
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change the value of  Y (2003, 83).  This manoeuvre exploits the thought that the causal dependence 11
of  Y on X “fails to express itself  in counterfactual dependence only because [the other 
symmetrically overdetermining cause] happens to be present as well” (2003, 83); if  we remove the 
influence of  other symmetrically overdetermining causes, we find the appropriate counterfactual 
dependence. A parallel approach to grounding overdetermination might motivate a revision to 
grounding interventionism (weak), such that, roughly, the relevant intervention on ⍺ would change the 
value of  β supposing we have negated the influence of  any symmetrically overdetermining grounds. 
 Even with such a qualification, the initial formulations of  grounding interventionism might 
still be thought to be confused. I have designed them to capture Schaffer’s and A. Wilson’s thought 
that grounding interventions target grounds. However, arguably cases of  grounding preemption show that 
this approach sometimes gets the direction of  necessity and dependence wrong. I will discuss 
grounding preemption in greater detail in section 4.2. The gist of  the problem is that grounded facts 
or entities can have multiple full grounds that perform their grounding role only when the others 
don’t. For instance, supposing a thing's redness grounds its being coloured, we can wiggle the 
ground (by making the thing blue) without changing the grounded (the thing will still be coloured). 
According to this line of  thought, it is misguided to intervene on the grounds, because the grounded 
doesn't counterfactually depend on the ground. The counterfactual dependence between ground and 
grounded runs in the opposite direction, so that if  the grounded were to change (such that the thing 
were no longer coloured), the ground would thereby change as well (the thing would no longer be 
red). In such cases, the interventionist must wiggle the grounded and see whether the ground wiggles.  12
To capture these sorts of  cases, grounding interventionists might revise their view in the following 
way, which would make it structurally disanalogous with causal interventionism: 
Grounding interventionism (disjunctive):  ⍺ grounds β only if  there is a possible intervention on ⍺ 
or β that, were it carried out, would change the value of  
the other variable. 
However, this revised approach arguably does not capture the motivation for the initial view, which 
was that grounds are like causes. It’s causes we intervene on, since the arrow of  determination flows 
from cause to effect, and that’s the objective asymmetry we want to capture. The same goes, mutatis 
mutandis, for grounds. So grounding interventionists may insist that the view has to be formulated in 
 For the formal details required to prevent this approach from being too permissive, see pp. 82-84 in 11
Woodward (2003).
 I thank Fabrice Correia for bringing this to my attention.12
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terms of  possible interventions on grounds, while instead proposing special ways of  bracketing or 
precluding preemption cases.  13
 Overdetermination and preemption aside, one might still think grounding interventionism is 
inherently confused. In particular, it may be argued that some cases of  grounding appear to involve 
bi-directional metaphysical necessitation — and that there is a fundamental lack of  fit between such 
cases and the interventionist paradigm. For instance, wiggling Socrates automatically wiggles 
Singleton Socrates and vice versa. Wiggling Singleton (whatever that might mean!) automatically 
wiggles Socrates. This suggests that some alleged grounding relata have a coarse-grained modal 
relationship that interventionist counterfactuals simply don’t capture: the relata necessarily co-exist, 
so there is no asymmetric counterfactual dependence between them, and as such you cannot 
intervene on one independently of  the other. One might suspect that this is a bug of  the example at 
issue — but the Singleton example is generally taken to be paradigmatic of  grounding!  
 The grounding formalism can allay some of  these concerns. For instance, Schaffer explains: 
“the idea that one can ‘surgically intervene’ requires a kind of  modularity condition on grounding, 
which corresponds to a free recombination assumption for the more fundamental”, in which “one 
can adjust one of  the more fundamental parameters while leaving the others as is” (2016, 71). We 
can represent Socrates and Singleton Socrates using distinct variables and encode their alleged 
asymmetric dependence into the equations we use to model them (2016, 73). This means that the 
formalism in which we enfold grounding “must tolerate” countermetaphysical and counterlogical 
scenarios (2016, 71), for which one needs a non-vacuous semantics.  So we can force asymmetry 14
into the grounding models. Whether this truly resolves the concern that some paradigm cases of  
grounding intuitively fail to exhibit asymmetric dependence is open to debate. 
 We have considered some initial formulations of  grounding interventionism involving 
counterfactual interventions being necessary and sufficient for grounding, being sufficient only, 
targeting grounds only, and targeting either grounds or grounded facts/entities. I will not privilege 
any of  the formulations that I have canvassed. My aim was just to consider some of  the available 
options. In the process, I hope to have illuminated some initial choice-points, challenges, and 
potential bones of  contention. I leave finer-grained articulations and defences of  the view to its 
would-be proponents. 
3. Interventions 
 Having sketched some basic formulations of  grounding interventionism, I can now proceed 
to ask what, precisely, a grounding intervention could be. I will start by considering how causal 
 For instance, on A. Wilson’s (2018) view, with a suitably restrictive notion of  intervention in which 13
interventions cut off  alternate grounding routes, the problem of  preemption doesn’t arise. In the case of  the 
red object, the right kind of  intervention makes the object colourless rather than blue. The right kind of  
intervention also precludes grounds from wiggling as a result of  wiggling the grounded. If  such an 
intervention were to make the thing colourless, the thing would (per impossibile) nevertheless remain red. I 
thank Al for raising these points in correspondence.
 On the semantics of  countermetaphysicals, see A. Wilson (2018a).14
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interventionists have precisified their notion of  an intervention. Again, I will take Woodward (2003) 
as the model. In his view, intervention is a token-level causal notion (2003, 98). Moreover, 
interventions need not be human manipulations; on the contrary, they bear no essential connection 
to human agency. Instead, an intervention on X with respect to Y changes the value of  X in such a 
way that if  any change occurs to Y, “it occurs only in virtue of  the change in the value of  X and not 
through some other causal route” (2003, 94). In other words, the intervention changes the value of  
X, such that any resulting change to Y goes through X, as opposed to resulting from some cause that 
merely correlates with the intervention. Woodward also stipulates that the change to X must be a 
result of  the intervention alone (2003, 96). In essence, an intervention alone changes the value of  X, 
which directly changes the value of  Y. 
 It is well known that this conception of  intervention invokes causation, for it is not clear 
what ‘directly changing’ the values of  variables could be if  not causal. As such, the notion of  an 
intervention does not provide independent purchase on causation, and it makes causal 
interventionism circular. However, Woodward stresses that his intention is not to provide a reductive 
account; instead, he intends to non-trivially elucidate causal concepts, claims, and the relations 
among them (2009, 253-254). Moreover, he argues that the circularity in question is non-vicious 
(2009, 254-255).  
 In cashing out the notion of  an intervention, Woodward also characterizes interventions in 
terms of  ideal experiments. Interventions are what we would do ideally — i.e. if  all practical 
impediments were removed — to test for causal relations (2003, 46). The appeal to ideal conditions 
is needed because interventions need not be practically possible. In fact, Woodward claims, they 
need not even be physically possible: “commitment to a manipulability theory leads unavoidably to 
the use of  counterfactuals concerning what would happen under conditions that may involve 
violations of  physical law” (emphasis removed, 2003, 132). For instance, we know that the 
gravitational attraction of  the moon causes the behaviour of  the tides. According to Woodward, 
while it may be physically impossible to change the position of  the moon alone or to perform 
similar interventions, we can still assess what would happen in such counterfactual scenarios and be 
confident in the resultant causal and explanatory claims. The counterfactuals that capture causal 
relations will inevitably include such counternomics.  
 If  the modal scope of  the ‘possible’ in ‘possible intervention’ is not limited to practical 
possibility or physical possibility, where does that leave us? Woodward claims: “an intervention on X 
with respect to Y will be ‘possible’ as long as it is logically or conceptually possible for a process 
meeting the conditions for an intervention on X with respect to Y to occur” (2003, 132). This 
means that the relevant modal space is remarkably broad. The only counterfactuals that cannot 
provide a test of  the truth of  causal claims are “those for which we cannot coherently describe what 
it would be like for the relevant intervention to occur at all or for which there is no conceivable basis 
for assessing claims about what would happen under such interventions…” (2003, 132). As such, 
causal interventionism requires us to assess counterfactuals inhabiting some of  the farthest reaches 
of  modal space. This means that causal interventionism requires a powerful modal epistemology. 
 With a clearer sense of  the notion of  a causal intervention in hand, we can now consider 
what a grounding intervention might be. If  causal and grounding interventions are analogous, then 
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in the case of  grounding, the relevant counterfactuals track token grounding relations. Let us say, 
closely following Woodward’s characterization of  causal interventions, that a grounding intervention 
on one variable with respect to another changes the value of  the one in such a way that if  any 
change occurs to the other, it occurs in virtue of  that first change. 
 Note that, just as causal interventionists invoke causation in their conception of  an 
intervention, grounding interventionists similarly invoke grounding. This is suggested by the 
presence of  the ‘in virtue of ’ locution in the characterization I just gave, which grounding theorists 
take to signal grounding (Fine 2012). If  so, then just as causal interventionism does not give 
independent purchase on causation, grounding interventionism does not give independent purchase 
on grounding. It is open to grounding interventionists to respond, as Woodward does, by 
emphasizing the non-reductive nature of  their view and by suggesting that its value is in its non-
trivial elucidation of  networks of  concepts and claims pertaining to grounding. 
 Having just noted the presence of  the ‘in virtue of ’ locution in the characterization of  a 
grounding intervention, we are well-positioned to see that grounding interventionism offers a 
unique response to a much-discussed puzzle in the metaphysics of  grounding: the question of  what, 
if  anything, grounds the grounding facts. Understood as an ontological thesis, grounding 
interventionism suggests that each token grounding fact obtains in virtue of  a corresponding 
possible intervention. That is to say, possible interventions ground the grounding facts. Here the 
grounding interventionist faces the additional question of  what grounds those second-order 
grounding facts, and so on. This issue has been addressed in different ways. Following Bennett 
(2011), the interventionist might say that possible interventions ground the first-order, second-order, 
third-order grounding facts — and so on to infinity, resulting in a well-founded and non-vicious 
infinite regress. Alternatively, they might characterize the second-order (and higher) grounding facts 
as autonomous in Dasgupta’s sense, i.e. “not apt for being grounded”, such that “the question of  what 
grounds them does not legitimately arise in the first place” (2014b, 563; see also 2016). I leave it to 
defenders of  the view to determine how best to further address the puzzle. 
 The most pressing question now is what changing the value of  the relevant variables 
amounts to. Let’s start with the causal case. On one natural interpretation, to change the value of  X 
is just what it sounds like: to plug a particular value (0 or 1, let’s say) in for X in the relevant causal 
model. This is, in effect, to add a condition or supposition to the model. But this cannot be what 
Woodward has in mind, because that would make all of  the interventions at issue physically and, 
indeed, practically possible — even easy! After all, I can set the values of  the variables as I like. So 
the interventions at issue are not interventions on our models but on the world. Changing the 
variable X must mean changing worldly circumstances in a manner at odds with the laws of  physics. 
So let us say that, in the causal case, changing the value of  X amounts to making some event occur 
or not occur.  
 As for grounding, what changing the value of  ⍺ ultimately amounts to will depend on what 
sorts of  things can be grounds. This is a matter of  disagreement. Schaffer (2009) takes grounding 
relata to be objects; others take them to be facts (Audi 2012, Dasgupta 2014a, and Fine 2012). If  the 
relata are objects, then changing the value of  ⍺ could mean bringing some object into or out of  
existence; in the case of  facts, it could mean making some fact obtain or not obtain.  
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 To make matters more concrete, let me appeal to some familiar examples. Take the following 
grounding claims: 
Disjunction: The truth of  P grounds the truth of  P∨Q. 
Singleton: The existence of  Socrates grounds the existence of  Singleton Socrates. 
Euthyphro: God's desiring that P grounds its being good that P. (A. Wilson 2018b, 731-732) 
In these examples, ‘wiggling the ground’ requires, respectively, making P false, removing Socrates 
from history, and making God desire differently. Just as we asked about whether and in what sense 
causal interventions are possible, we can ask the same of  these grounding interventions. Assume for 
convenience the standard nested model of  possibility space, in which physical possibility is nested 
within a space of  metaphysical possibility, itself  nested within a space of  logical possibility. 
Regarding the disjunction case, the possibility of  the intervention is indeterminate, since whether 
and in what sense it is possible to make P false depends on what P says. In the case of  Socrates, it is 
physically impossible (I assume) for us, temporally situated as we are, to remove him from history. 
As such, the intervention in virtue of  which the grounding relation holds inhabits the merely 
metaphysical space of  possibility, outside the space of  physical possibility. 
 As for God desiring differently, the details depend on the theology held fixed, but I take it 
no theist thinks anyone can make God do anything, given God’s supposed omnipotence. It is an 
interesting question what sort of  modality is at issue. For a human to force a change to God 
wouldn’t break any physical laws, since (pace Spinoza) God is supposedly not part of  the natural 
world they describe. One might think the intervention is metaphysically impossible or, for 
conceptual reasons, logically impossible.  Perhaps, in an ideal experiment, the human intervener 15
would be omnipotent, too. In that case, we get a variation of  the paradox of  omnipotence, which we 
might also interpret as a symptom of  logical impossibility. Where grounding interventionism 
requires us to countenance counterlogicals, it takes us right off  the standard map of  modal space. 
These familiar examples suggest that grounding interventionism may require us to countenance 
counterpossible, countermetaphysical, and counterlogical interventions.  
 In fact, if  one thinks that grounds are sometimes physically, metaphysically, or logically 
necessary — as grounding theorists surely do — then examples like this will proliferate, since 
wiggling such grounds requires doing the impossible, in the respective senses. Take the following 
claims: 
1. The fact that nothing can travel faster than light grounds the fact that events occurring in 
different light cones are causally isolated.  
2. The fact that water is H2O grounds the fact that this sample of  H2O is a sample of  water. 
3. The law of  non-contradiction grounds the fact that the statement ‘whales are mammals’ is 
either true or false but not both. 
 This example of  an apparent physical possibility that is, at the same time, metaphysically impossible 15
complicates matters by showing that we must refine either the standard characterization of  physical possibility 
(in terms of  consistency with physical law) or the standard nested picture of  modal space. 
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These are plausible candidates for grounding claims, because they involve a kind of  non-causal 
explanation of  particular facts by appeal to more general principles. Now, suppose we wiggle the 
grounds. Doing so would involve 1) making it possible for things to travel faster than light, 2) 
altering the essence of  water, and 3) rendering false the law of  non-contradiction. Arguably, the 
envisaged interventions are counternomic, countermetaphysical, and counterlogical interventions, 
respectively.  If  such examples are any indication, grounding interventionism requires us to 16
countenance interventions that are possible only at the farthest reaches of  modal space. 
 Let’s take stock. Grounding interventions can be understood in a manner closely parallel to 
causal interventions, i.e. as changes to the value of  variables representing grounding relata. Given 
that some of  those interventions are impossible, ‘changing the value of  variables’ has to be 
understood in worldly terms. Depending on one’s conception of  the grounding relata, this might 
mean adding or deleting something from the roster of  existents, or making some fact obtain or fail 
to obtain. Just as causal interventionism requires that we assess counterfactuals whose antecedents 
are possible only in remote regions of  modal space, grounding interventionism makes a similar 
demand. So both views ask us to make judgments about modally remote counterfactual scenarios. 
The next question I wish to address is: how might we do that? 
4. Knowledge of  Interventionist Counterfactuals 
 Since causal interventionism is the comparatively well-explored progenitor of  grounding 
interventionism, it will be instructive to examine its epistemological credentials alongside those of  
grounding interventionism. So how does the causal interventionist think we achieve our epistemic 
aims — whether knowledge, justified belief, understanding, confirmation, learning or discovery — 
with regard to causation?  
 In the most epistemically ideal cases, we simply do the manipulations. That is the best way 
of  finding out about causal dependencies. Where deriving a causal claim requires making a judgment 
about some practically possible intervention, sometimes it suffices to run inductions on prior 
experience of  type-identical or suitably similar causal relations (compare Roca-Royes 2017). Going 
beyond practical possibility, Woodward suggests that, as the sorts of  creatures who can interact with 
and manipulate aspects of  the world, we develop practices of  causal inference and explanation, 
which we can extend from cases where manipulation is possible to cases where it’s not (2003, 11). 
For physically possible interventions, our knowledge of  the physical laws can guide our judgments. 
 One inspired by Woodward (2003) might say that we have no clear conception of  what these experimental 16
interventions would involve, and so the corresponding counterfactuals lack a clear meaning or truth value. 
One might worry that this line of  thought makes trouble for a significant proportion of  grounding cases, in 
which case one might also worry that grounding interventionists have overextended the interventionist 
framework. In response, grounding interventionists could endorse a more permissive standard of  
meaningfulness for their counterfactuals, but doing so would not eliminate the problem of  having to assess 
counterfactuals the antecedents of  which one cannot clearly conceive. A better response would be to argue 
that we do have a clear conception of  the required interventions and to elucidate it. I leave that task to them.
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However, these sorts of  piecemeal methods will only get us so far, especially relative to the vast 
space of  logically possible interventions to which the causal interventionist indexes causality.  
 Is there anything more general that we can say in the elucidation of  an epistemology that can 
underwrite interventionist frameworks? Given the centrality of  counterfactuals to interventionist 
frameworks, such an epistemology would be, largely, an epistemology of  counterfactuals. So it will 
be illuminating to consider which sorts of  epistemic resources might figure into the assessment of  
counterfactuals generally and interventionist counterfactuals in particular. I will consider three such 
resources: 1) imagination, 2) structural equation models, and 3) theoretical constraints.  
4.1 Imagination 
 I begin with Williamson’s (2007b) epistemology of  counterfactuals, to which there have been 
numerous critical responses.  My aim here is not to address the independent feasibility of  the 17
account but to see how conjoining it with causal and grounding interventionisms affects their 
epistemic credentials. Williamson suggests that the story of  counterfactual knowledge is 
developmental and evolutionarily un-mysterious. As individuals accrue experience over time, their 
experience conditions them into “patterns of  expectation which are called on in [their] assessment 
of  ordinary counterfactual conditionals” (2007b, 167). Importantly, counterfactual thinking often 
invokes the imagination, “radically informed and disciplined” by an empirical background of  beliefs 
and an accompanying folk physics (2007b, 143). Against that background, imaginative simulation 
allows us to discern, for instance, that “[i]f  the bush had not been there, the rock would have ended 
in the lake” (2007b, 142).  
 We can think of  our process of  imaginatively assessing the relevant counterfactuals as 
involving the performance, not of  ordinary causal manipulations, but of  imaginative interventions. In 
imaginative intervention, we imagine changing a variable (in the worldly sense discussed above) and 
imaginatively simulate what would result. I imaginatively remove the bush and simulate the resultant 
path of  the rock. While ‘imaginative intervention’ may sound novel and fancy, ultimately, imaginative 
interventions are just thought experiments, in which we “work through the implications of  
scenarios” (Gendler 2010, 1-2).  If  so, we assess interventionist counterfactuals by running thought 18
experiments. 
 Now, if  imagination is the primary mode of  epistemic access to counterfactuals, how good 
are the causal interventionist’s and the grounding interventionist’s chances of  knowledge (or 
justification, or whatever) of  causation and grounding, respectively? Williamson notes that our 
ability to handle mundane counterfactuals might not extend equally well to all reaches of  modal 
space: 
[W]e may well be more reliable in evaluating counterfactuals whose antecedents involve small 
departures from the actual world than in evaluating those whose antecedents involve much 
larger departures. We may be correspondingly more reliable in evaluating the possibility of  
 See Casullo (2012), Gregory (2017), Jenkins (2008), Mallozzi (2021), Roca-Royes (2011), and Tahko (2012).17
 On the role of  imagination in thought experiments, see also Arcangeli (2010) and Meynell (2014, 2018).18
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everyday scenarios than of  ‘far-out’ ones, and extra caution may be called for in the latter 
case. (2007b, 164) 
The more familiar the imagined scenario, the more reliable imagination will be as a source of  modal 
information; the less familiar, the less confidence we should have in its deliverances.  Williamson 19
therefore speaks approvingly of  those philosophers who have comparatively low confidence in their 
“radically strange” imaginative exercises (2007b, 164).   20
 If  Williamson is right, then his epistemology of  counterfactuals makes the epistemic 
credentials of  causal interventionism rather a mixed bag. That’s because causal interventionists 
demand the assessment of  both relatively mundane counterfactuals and relatively strange ones, and 
modal imagination is a better guide to the former than to the latter.  The epistemic value of  the 21
imagination in a particular context depends largely on how the imagination is constrained in that 
context.  It is because the imagination is ‘radically informed and disciplined’ by experience that it is, 22
on Williamson’s view, plausibly reliable in the evaluation of  mundane counterfactuals concerning 
things like rock trajectories — i.e. in situations where folk physics is adequate for our predictive 
purposes; it is because imagination lacks adequate constraint in less mundane cases that it is not 
obviously reliable in those cases.  The upshot is that modal imagination has highly restricted 23
adequacy conditions. When it comes to strange enough counternomics, ordinary experience doesn’t 
adequately prepare the imagination, and assessing them requires us to stretch our imaginative 
capacities beyond their adequacy conditions.  
 What happens then? Recall the idea that our imaginative simulations of  counterfactual 
scenarios are thought experiments. We can compare the epistemic constraints on those thought 
experiments with those on real-life scientific experiments: 
In the case of  actual experiments, the theory-relevant evidence generally takes the form of  
data concerning the behavior of  the physical world under specific conditions; in the case of  
thought experiments, the theory-relevant evidence generally takes the form of  intuitions (or 
predictions) concerning such behavior. (Gendler 2010, 2) 
 Similarly, Nichols points out that it’s less clear that we can trust the verdicts of  imagination about absolute 19
possibility and necessity, as compared with local risk and opportunity (2006, 253).
 Some conceive of  metaphysics as an importantly imaginative endeavour. For instance, Godfrey-Smith 20
(2012) characterizes metaphysics as model-building, which involves imaginative modification of  reality. Paul 
(2012) likewise characterizes it as model-building, the methodology of  which “should accommodate 
imagining”, among other things (2012, 23 fn. 30).  It is an interesting question whether such a picture 
demands an adjustment to our sense of  the epistemic aims of  metaphysics. McSweeney (forthcoming) 
considers just this sort of  question when she argues that metaphysics is essentially imaginative and defends its 
value relative to the epistemic aim of  understanding.
 This makes sense evolutionarily, in that, as Nichols points out, “the connection between imagination and 21
modal judgment presumably earned its keep by facilitating nomological modal judgments” (2006, 246).
 On the notion of  epistemic constraint, its role and significance, see Bryant (2021).22
 However, there are exceptions. For instance, imagination sometimes does poorly in seemingly mundane 23
cases, e.g. in cases where we attempt to imaginatively predict our own responses to situations (Maibom 2016).
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That is, in cases where empirical evidence cannot inform or constrain imaginative simulations, 
imagination frequently calls on antecedent intuitions. I will suppose that intuitions are ‘gut feeling’ 
judgments. Now, these moves are admittedly quick. Intuitions have been characterized in a number 
of  ways.  Moreover, the network of  relations among intuitions, thought experiments, imagination, 24
science and non-science is undoubtedly complex and deserves a deeper treatment than I can give 
here.  On the definitional matter, I’m just stipulating. On the role of  intuitions in thought 25
experiments, I believe a natural characterization of  what it is for a judgment to be made ‘from the 
gut’ is for it to be made without significant guidance from experience, among other forms of  
evidence and constraint (such as logical constraint, to be discussed further below). We lack such 
guidance in pervasive, weird metaphysical cases. Thus, we rely on intuition when thinking through 
such cases.  
 By invoking intuitions, causal interventionism invokes one of  the primary epistemic 
resources of  modal rationalism in a way that diminishes the appeal of  the view. While such 
judgments are valuable in contexts of  discovery, in contexts of  justification, they are epistemically 
suspect for a number of  familiar reasons. Some experimental evidence points to their cultural 
variation, and some suggests they are strongly vulnerable to cognitive bias.  Moreover, science has a 26
track record of  repeatedly overturning common sense metaphysical intuitions (Shtulman and 
Harrington 2016), including even the strongest modal intuitions, such as the intuitions “that non-
Euclidean geometry is impossible as a model of  physical space, that it is impossible that there not be 
deterministic causation, [and] that non-absolute time is impossible” (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 16). 
Since surprise is a measure of  scientific success (French and Murphy forthcoming), we might even 
think that counterintuitiveness is characteristic of  scientific discovery. These points cast serious doubt 
on the evidential weight of  intuitions. However, independently of  these sorts of  arguments, I 
believe that in many contexts — metaphysics included — there is little reason to take intuitions to 
be even defeasibly evidential in the first place. At the far reaches of  modal space, where experience 
leaves imagination blind and counterfactual evaluation must invoke intuition, the causal 
interventionist’s epistemology is rendered ineffectually rationalist.  
 As for grounding interventionism, it fares worse that its causal cousin when coupled with 
Williamson’s epistemology of  counterfactuals. In the causal case, imagination operates against a 
relatively rosy epistemological backdrop. We have (pace Hume) a great deal of  empirically-based 
causal knowledge. As Woodward stresses (2003, 34), many causal dependencies are evidenced by 
 Booth and Rowbottom (2014), Cappelen (2012), Deutsch (2015), Devitt (2015), Dorr (2010), Gendler 24
(2010), Nicoli (2016), Weinberg (2016).
 See, for instance, Levy and Godfrey-Smith (2019). 25
 On their cultural variability, see Beebe and Undercoffer (2016), Machery et al. (2004), Li et al. (2018), 26
Nichols et al. (2003), and Weinberg et al. (2001); on their vulnerability to cognitive bias, see Andow (2016), 
Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012), Swain et al. (2008), and Wheatley and Haidt (2005).
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actual experimentation. Prior experience of  causal patterns reliably enables prediction.  We also 27
appear to have a hardwired capacity to identify instances of  causation that “emerges early in 
development, and in some cases is remarkably fast and efficient” (Woodward 2003, 29). So the 
causal interventionist can capitalize on a great deal of  prior working knowledge of  causation. 
 By contrast, in the grounding case, the epistemological backdrop is less auspicious. The sorts 
of  grounding relations typically at issue in metaphysics are distinctively metaphysical, composing a 
level of  metaphysical structure that is not directly empirically discoverable, to which we have only 
indirect epistemic access. Neither prior experience nor empirical experimentation informs judgments 
about, for instance, abstract objects like Singleton Socrates or non-empirical matters like the 
goodness of  an action. Neither should we hold our collective breath for studies in developmental 
psychology to show that we excel at identifying instances of  grounding, since grounding is tied to 
practices of  abstract metaphysical explanation rather than to the sphere of  action and decision-
making like its causal cousin. With grounding, we just don’t have the epistemic traction we have with 
causation.  
 The fact is that the metaphysics of  grounding gets murky and perplexing, fast. Some 
grounding interventions are ‘radically strange’, as Williamson put it. With countermetaphysicals, 
experience constrains the imagination even less than it does with counternomics — and leaves it 
even more reliant on intuitions that we have no good reason to believe are reliable or evidential. If  
so, then an imagination-based epistemology of  counterfactuals renders grounding interventionism 
epistemically impoverished, and grounding interventionists must either defend the permissibility of  
stretching our imaginative resources beyond their adequacy conditions or point to some other mode 
of  epistemic access to the relevant modal truths. 
4.2 Structural Equation Models 
 Perhaps would-be grounding interventionists can benefit from an alternate (potentially 
complementary) tack, in which they co-opt formal tools that have been used fruitfully to model 
causal relations. In this vein, Schaffer claims that “the causal discovery algorithms associated with 
structural equation models furnish as precise and well-understood an epistemology as one could 
hope for” (2016, 67). Since those models are not inherently causal, Schaffer (2016) and A. Wilson 
(2018a, 2018b) are optimistic about the prospects of  structural equation models to illuminate 
features of  grounding structure and to reveal first-order grounding facts. Schaffer is careful to 
emphasize that the models are not a “magical panacea” but rather the best available formalism 
(2016, 61).  
 In essence, structural equation models comprise variables representing independent and 
dependent conditions (i.e. causes and effects; grounds and grounded entities or facts) and structural 
equations that say what the value of  dependent variables will be given certain values for the 
independent ones. Modellers then say ‘what actually happens’ (Schaffer 2016, 62), by assigning 
 Jansson (2018) likewise highlights how a posteriori knowledge of  local causal matters constrains judgments 27
of  the aptness of  causal models.
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values to the independent variables. The models then spit out values for the dependent variables, 
from which we read off  causal or grounding claims. 
 Schaffer acknowledges various complicating factors here. First, as we have seen, it is 
controversial how best to read token relations off  causal models — and by extension grounding 
models — in problem cases such as those involving preemption (2016, 65). In particular, some argue 
that structural equation models must distinguish between default and deviant variables, 
corresponding to expected and surprising events, respectively.  In response, Blanchard and Schaffer 28
(2017) argue that the distinction encodes a cognitive bias that influences causal judgment but that 
shouldn’t be incorporated into models of  causation itself.  
 Second, it is also a matter of  debate how to handle the problem of  underdetermination. As 
Schaffer explains, there can be multiple apt models of  a situation, and they can disagree over 
causation. In such cases, it’s not clear which causal claims we should commit to or why. While we 
might relativize causal claims to particular models, doing so eliminates the metaphysical objectivity 
we might have hoped for (2016, 68).  
 Finally, Schaffer acknowledges that like interventionism itself, structural equation models are 
also circular. That’s because the division of  variables into independent and dependent conditions 
and the parent-child asymmetry of  the structural equations are built into the models (2016, 66). At 
any rate, it is clear that structural equation models don’t make all substantive questions and 
difficulties disappear; on the contrary, they come with their own deep and difficult choice-points.  
 Let us suppose for argument’s sake that, in time, these issues will be satisfactorily resolved. 
Other prospective problems still remain. For instance, Koslicki (2016) presents a number of  reasons 
to doubt that structural equation models apply equally well to grounding as to causation. Among 
other things, she argues that prototypical cases of  grounding like the determinate/determinable 
relation are problem cases for structural equation models because they are structurally similar to 
cases of  massive causal preemption. For instance, Koslicki considers Schaffer’s own example of  the 
shirt’s being maroon grounding the shirt’s being red. She points out that the example is case in 
which wiggling the grounds need not wiggle the grounded, because supposing the shirt’s color 
changes from maroon to crimson, “the shirt continues to be red, only in a different way” (2016, 
107). So we have a case of  grounding that is analogous to a case of  massive causal preemption, in 
that the grounded can be brought about by multiple grounds, each of  which can individually 
constitute a full ground and obtains only if  the others don’t obtain. Koslicki remarks:  
At most, then, we are dealing with a situation in which a supposedly clear case of  grounding 
is comparable to a problematic case of  causation, one which has led to headaches for extant 
theories of  causation including, by Schaffer’s own admission, the structural equation model 
of  causation. (2016, 108) 
If  Koslicki is right that structural equation models render problematic erstwhile unproblematic cases 
of  grounding, then we might doubt that structural equation models are really the key to a 
satisfactory grounding interventionist epistemology. In fact, from these and other concerns relating 
to the extension of  structural equation models to grounding (e.g. those of  Jansson 2018), one might 
 See for instance Menzies (2007), Hitchcock (2007), and Hall (2007).28
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draw the conclusion that, far from being a beneficial component of  a satisfactory epistemology of  
grounding, the interventionist framework makes theories of  ground worse off epistemically than they 
would be otherwise. This is a stronger conclusion than I presently wish to defend, but I flag it as a 
live possibility. 
 At any rate, suppose again for the sake of  argument that interventionists can adequately 
resolve this concern by developing a novel approach to preemption cases.  If  they were to do so, 29
could we then say that structural equation models imbue grounding interventionism with adequate 
epistemological resources? I believe not.  
 To my mind, a central factor to consider in evaluating the potential of  structural equation 
models to flesh out the grounding interventionist’s epistemological story is that we don’t just want to 
model causation and grounding; we want to model them well. It’s clear that we need good reason to 
be confident of  what we put in to our models — including, among other things, the functions that 
purportedly relate the variables — before we can justifiably be confident of  what the models spit 
out. This much is uncontroversial. Indeed, Schaffer acknowledges the point explicitly:  
I am not trying to show that merely by adopting the structural equations formalism, one gets 
the right answers to grounding questions for free. On the contrary: to get the right answers 
to grounding questions one has to put the right structural equations into the model, which 
encode the form and direction of  dependency. (2016, 77) 
Likewise, one of  Schaffer’s aptness conditions for grounding models requires that the 
counterfactuals encoded in the model’s equations be true (2016, 75). So the need for true (or 
justified, or known, or otherwise epistemically well-founded) starting counterfactuals is clear and 
acknowledged. But this immediately raises an important and more foundational epistemological 
question. Why should we think those counterfactuals are true (or justified, or known, etc.)? 
Grounding theorists may fill in this more foundational epistemological blank as they like. Yet the 
presence of  such a blank shows that structural equation models can only supplement the grounding 
interventionist’s epistemology. We need independent reasons for believing or accepting the 
counterfactuals we use to set up our structural equation models. So structural equation models 
cannot form the basis of  an independently adequate epistemology of  interventionist 
counterfactuals, nor are they intended to. Rather, they must complement some further and more 
foundational epistemic resource, in virtue of  which we can be assured that we’re setting up the 
relevant models well. The epistemic credentials of  causal and grounding interventionism will then 
largely hang on the reliability of  that resource. 
   
4.3 Theoretical Constraint 
 One possibility is that certain theoretical constraints could provide the needed epistemic 
resource. I have discussed the nature and importance of  such constraints elsewhere (Bryant 2021), 
but the general idea is simple and familiar: holding fixed certain background claims restricts the sorts 
of  further claims we can make. In the interventionist context, one might hope that background 
 For instance, by taking A. Wilson’s (2018) approach to such cases (see footnote 10).29
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theory can appropriately constrain counterfactual assessment. Three main candidates immediately 
suggest themselves: background science, background logic, and background metaphysics.  
 First, let’s consider whether science can adequately constrain the assessment of  
interventionist counterfactuals. Here, we might take inspiration from certain causal interventionists. 
For instance, in their manipulationist account of  causation, Menzies and Price appeal to artificial 
simulations to make sense of  how we can justify causal claims about unmanipulable events. Take the 
claim that some earthquake was caused by friction between continental plates. Menzies and Price 
argue: 
We can make such causal claims because we believe that there is another situation that 
models the circumstances surrounding the earthquake in the essential respects and does 
support a means-end relation between an appropriate pair of  events. The paradigm example 
of  such a situation would be that created by seismologists in their artificial simulations of  the 
movement of  continental plates. (1993, 197) 
The simulation informs judgments about the relevant counterfactuals because it adequately models 
the mechanics of  earthquakes. When artificial simulations are founded on a rich body of  data and 
have a track record of  predictive success, they can significantly aid counterfactual reasoning.  
 That’s fine for the physical possibilities, but matters get trickier when it comes to 
counternomics. Woodward is cognizant of  the epistemological worries that arise from his move 
toward conceptual or logical possibility. He admits: 
It is arguable that as we make the relevant notion of  ‘possible intervention’ more and more 
permissive, so that it includes contra-nomic possibilities and so on, we reach a point at which 
this notion and the counterfactuals in which it figures become so unclear that we can no 
longer use them to illuminate… causal claims. (2009, 256) 
That’s because it is unclear what the proposed intervention would involve and how to determine 
what would result from it (2009, 257). If  so, then perhaps counternomics might be thought to take 
us beyond the “natural range of  application” of  causal interventionism (2009, 256).  
 However, Woodward suggests that, at least in some cases, elements of  well-confirmed 
scientific theories constrain our judgment with regard to physical impossibilities. Recall the example 
of  the moon’s gravitational attraction and its effect on the tides. Woodward suggests: 
Although it may be true that any actual physical process that changes the position of  the 
moon will also directly influence the tides, Newtonian theory and familiar rules about the 
composition of  forces tell us how to subtract out any direct influence from such a process 
so that we can calculate just what the effect of, say, doubling of  the moon’s orbit (and no 
other changes) would be on the tides, even though it also may be true that there is no way of  
actually realizing this effect alone. (2003, 131) 
That is, the appropriate physical theory can help us to establish the right kind of  modularity in our 
model of  the intervention and its consequences. Woodward continues: 
Newtonian theory itself  delivers a determinate answer to questions about what would 
happen to the tides under an intervention that doubles the moon’s orbit, and this is enough 
for counterfactual claims about what would happen under such interventions to be 
legitimate and to allow us to assess their truth. (2003, 131) 
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So science can constrain our assessments of  at least some counternomics.  
 Does this approach give causal interventionism adequate epistemic footing? The example 
works because it involves isolating variables that wouldn’t normally be isolable in an otherwise familiar 
possible world; it’s less clear that science can guide inferences about worlds where the physical laws 
differ more significantly from those of  the actual world. At any rate, when causal interventionism 
invokes (as it inevitably does) counterfactuals with merely logically or conceptually possible 
antecedents, science doesn’t obviously help. So the appeal to scientific models and background 
theory as a means of  answering questions about counternomic scenarios may go some way to 
allaying concerns about the epistemic credentials of  causal interventionism, but it won’t provide a 
completely satisfying story. 
 As for grounding interventionism, scientific models and background theory are likewise 
powerless to constrain our reasoning about certain paradigmatic metaphysical cases.  For instance, 30
science has no clear bearing on what would happen to Singleton Socrates had Socrates not existed or 
to the good had God desired differently. As such, while the framework of  interventionism does 
possess a moderate glow of  scientific respectability (owing in part to its intimate ties with causal 
modelling), it does not impart that same glow to standard-fare metaphysics of  ground. That is to say, 
at the risk of  bursting certain bubbles, if  causal interventionism has reasonably good naturalistic 
credentials, theories of  ground don’t necessarily improve their own naturalistic standing just by co-
opting interventionist language and resources. 
 While science doesn’t appear to bear on the standard metaphysical cases, it might be thought 
that a special class of  semi-empirical grounding claims can be drawn from science and usefully 
modelled within the interventionist framework. While it may not be obvious at first glance, science 
does have some relevance to questions of  ground (Bryant 2018), which is evidenced by other sorts 
of  example. For instance, suppose that being an electron grounds having negative charge (Audi 
2012, 117). Suppose also that x is an electron. To test this grounding claim, the grounding 
interventionist would have us assess the following counterfactual: if  an intervention were to remove 
the property of  being an electron from x, x would no longer have negative charge. Now, science 
does bear on the assessment of  this counterfactual, by furnishing us with requisite background 
information about the characteristic properties of  electrons. Science also tells us that other sorts of  
particles can be negatively charged. However, metaphysics rears its head when we ask whether x 
might have been one of  those other sorts of  particles. So scientific background theory may help to 
constrain our assessments of  some such grounding counterfactuals, but murky metaphysical 
questions quickly intrude.  
 We may also wonder what proportion of  grounding counterfactuals will be amenable to 
scientific constraint. As I noted above, grounding theorists commonly posit grounding relations 
among abstract, non-empirical relata, where scientific models and background theory are not clearly 
 Jansson (2018) argues, similarly, that while our assessments of  the aptness of  causal models are constrained 30
by local, a posteriori theories of  causal mechanisms and processes, there is no analogous a posteriori 
constraint on our judgments of  the aptness of  grounding models. While I agree with the general sentiment, I 
don’t think the point holds universally; as the next paragraph will make clear, empirical and scientific 
background theory provides at least partial epistemic constraint in some cases of  grounding. 
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relevant. At any rate, as we have seen, the epistemology gets a lot murkier when we come to far out 
counterfactuals such as countermetaphysicals. As I noted in the case of  causal interventionism, 
when we assess certain modally remote counterfactuals, the door is open for scientifically unmoored 
intuitions to sneak into modal judgment. The greater the evidential role those intuitions play, the 
more suspect the epistemology of  grounding interventionism will be.  
 To the extent that grounding interventionists wish to reason about counterfactuals to which 
scientific background theory offers little guidance, those interventionists would do well to invoke 
further constraints. For instance, one might wonder whether logic can constrain the assessment of  
grounding counterfactuals. Indeed it can — and this is relatively straightforward in certain cases. For 
instance, so long as P and Q aren’t necessarily true statements, wiggle P and you wiggle P∧Q. Even 
in more modally remote cases, where we must consider counterlogicals, our reasoning can be well 
constrained by clear formal frameworks for reasoning in the face of  contradictions. This shows that 
it’s not modal remoteness per se that is most epistemically relevant factor, but how well our epistemic 
resources constrain counterfactual assessment. At any rate, the results of  interventions that follow as 
a straightforward matter of  logic are one thing; the results of  interventions in meatier metaphysical 
matters are another. Does wiggling the part wiggle the whole, the brain state the mental state, the 
determinate the determinable, the truthmaker the truth, the natural properties the moral 
properties…? Our theories concerning such matters are subject to logical constraints just like any 
other theories, but logic radically underdetermines the answers to these questions and thus does not 
constitute an adequately robust constraint of  its own accord (see Bryant 2020). I suggest that the 
straightforward cases in which logic adequately constrains the assessment of  grounding 
counterfactuals don’t constitute a particularly large swath of  the sorts of  counterfactuals that 
theorists of  ground are interested in. 
 Perhaps a more substantive form of  constraint can come from background metaphysical 
theory. Once again, there are relatively straightforward cases of  this. If  we hold fixed a metaphysics 
according to which sets supervene on their members, that metaphysics has clear implications for 
what happens when we wiggle Socrates. If  we hold fixed a metaphysics according to which God’s 
will uniquely determines the good, that metaphysics has clear implications for what happens when 
we wiggle God’s will. Note that the imagination isn’t invoked in these cases; all that’s needed is an 
understanding of  the relevant metaphysical principles and relations, as well as some basic logical 
capacities. 
 However, we need to know a fair bit about the relevant dependence relations before we can 
perform the relevant counterfactual assessments — we need to know that sets supervene on such-and-
such and that God’s will uniquely determines so-and-so.  So it’s not clear — at least from these initial 31
paradigm cases — to what extent this approach fosters the discovery of  new information about 
hierarchical structure. What is clear is that appeal to metaphysical constraint makes grounding 
interventionism an exercise in determining what follows from our antecedent metaphysical 
commitments, not a direct interrogation of  objective grounding structure. Some might think that’s a 
perfectly acceptable place to situate theories of  ground in the epistemic scene and a perfectly fine 
 If  grounding critics like J. Wilson (2014) and Koslicki (2015) are right, in having such knowledge, we have a 31
finer-grained understanding of  the dependence at issue than we do by positing a grounding relation. 
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characterization of  what grounding theorists are up to. But for those grounding theorists with loftier 
epistemic aims, this may be an unacceptable limitation of  the approach.  
 It’s also worth emphasizing that what gets held fixed as the metaphysical background theory 
is relatively open — perhaps too open for us to be assured that we’re engaging effectively in a truth-
seeking activity. While there is relative consensus about many matters in science (which is, of  course, 
complemented by much substantive disagreement, e.g. about matters of  theoretical interpretation 
and unification), there is comparatively far less consensus on matters metaphysical (which isn’t to say 
there is no such consensus). Most things are up for grabs in metaphysics, including even 
foundational assumptions and basic conceptual matters. So in many cases, how one fixes the 
metaphysical background will depend on one’s metaphysical proclivities and allegiances. This makes 
grounding interventionism no more factional than the rest of  metaphysics, but it does somewhat 
quash any latent hope that the interventionist framework might lend increased objectivity to theories 
of  ground. 
5. Conclusion 
 The aim of  this paper was to consider the prospects for an adequately formulated and 
epistemologically well-founded grounding analog of  causal interventionism. I considered several 
formulations of  grounding interventionism, in which grounding relations are (non-reductively) 
cashed out in terms of  possible interventions on variables representing grounding relata. A 
grounding intervention on one variable with respect to another changes the value of  the one in such 
a way that if  any change occurs to the other, it occurs in virtue of  the change in the value of  the 
one. We saw that such interventions should be understood in worldly terms, as adding something to 
or deleting something from the roster of  entities, or making some fact obtain or fail to obtain.   
 After considering candidate formulations of  the view, I turned to the evaluation of  its 
epistemic credentials. This involved considering how well imagination, structural equation models, 
and background theory constrain our assessments of  interventionist counterfactuals. I argued that 
causal interventionism and grounding interventionism both demand that we stretch our imaginative 
capacities beyond their adequacy conditions when they ask us to assess certain modally remote 
counterfactuals that neither experience nor other forms of  evidence and constraint adequately 
prepare us to assess. In such cases, imagination relies on unchecked intuition. Moreover, I argued 
that structural equation models merely formalize causal and grounding assumptions that require 
independent justification. Finally, I argued that while certain forms of  background theory can help 
constrain the assessment of  some causal and grounding counterfactuals, our epistemic grip weakens 
relatively quickly. In the trickier cases, counterfactual reasoning again invokes unfettered intuitions. 
Just how satisfied we should be with these epistemological options depends on the proportion of  
causal and grounding counterfactuals whose assessment is robustly constrained relative to those 
whose assessment isn’t. In my view, the available epistemological options for causal interventionism 
and grounding interventionism are insufficiently powerful relative to the full spectrum of  cases 
philosophers tend to be are interested in — especially so for cases of  grounding. As such, grounding 
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interventionism requires firmer epistemological foundations if  it is to be a viable and attractive 
theoretical alternative. 
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